August 21-25, 2023, Abuja, Nigeria
FINAL COMMUNIQUE
PREAMBLE:
1) The Regional Stakeholders’ Workshop on the Outcomes of the Typologies Study of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Linked to Corruption in West Africa was held in Abuja, Nigeria from 21st to 25th of August 2023, at the Nicon Luxury Hotel Conference Room.
2) One of the main objectives of the workshop was to engage stakeholders at a regional level to explore the findings and recommendations of the study and to share experiences on anti-corruption practices as well as the relevance of the FATF Standards in curbing corruption.
The meeting gathered about fifty (50) participants from anti-corruption agencies, financial intelligence units, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges, and other relevant actors playing key roles in the detection, investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of corruption cases in GIABA member states.
3) In attendance at the opening ceremony of the meeting were the Representative of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Justice, the Director of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, the Representative of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), as well as the Representative of the Director General of GIABA. They were the dignitaries on the high table at the event. The list of participants is here attached.
4) The five-day workshop took the form of a roundtable with thematic presentations, breakout sessions and plenary discussions on issues and challenges around the detection, investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of corruption cases in GIABA member states. The discussions on the various presentations and the sharing of experiences brought to light the following:
KEY FINDINGS:
I. On the magnitude of corruption and its negative impacts on national economies
i. Corruption is one of the predicate crimes for money laundering. It is a major source of illicit proceeds in West Africa, which is laundered using different methods and techniques both at home and abroad. It is also the most potent enabler and facilitator of many criminal activities, as well as a major hinderance to countries’ ability to build robust and effective AML/CFT regimes.
ii. Corruption opportunities in the public service are dynamic and mostly driven by human interfaces in service delivery and revenue mobilization and collection.
iii. Corruption is deeply ingrained in both the public and private sectors. Various acts such as embezzlement, theft of public funds, bribery, contract, and procurement fraud are prevalent in different sectors of the economy.
iv. Typologies and case studies have revealed that obstruction of justice remains one of the bottlenecks to the implementation of effective AML/CFT and anti-corruption regimes.
v. Suspects of large-scale corruption are generally found to be public officials and public office holders, primarily PEPs. The proceeds generated by their corrupt practices are systematically laundered, notably in financial or stock market products offered by financial institutions, and through the acquisition of lands and similar real estate properties, agriculture, livestock and other formal or informal business sectors.
vi. Corruption and Money Laundering increase social and economic inequalities, leading to social radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism. It also results in huge losses of fiscal and customs revenue, which limit the states’ ability to provide access to basic social services, especially for provinces and rural populations.
II. On the quality of countries responses to corruption and associated illicit financial flows
i. Member States have taken adequate measures to internalize the Maputo and Merida Conventions against Corruption in their National Laws, which resulted in the establishment of national anti-corruption agencies, with various degrees of powers, responsibilities and challenges.
ii. Powers and responsibilities of national anti-corruption agencies in some countries rarely include investigative and prosecutorial functions. However, all the countries are generally limited by their legal and operational capacities to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
iii. The FATF Recommendations play a significant role in the fight against corruption, especially in terms of the private sector’s contribution to the detection of corruption and money laundering cases. However, reporting entities are not adequately informed and equipped to develop an accurate and up-to-date database on PEPs and to apply subsequent due diligence in respect of their investigative and prosecutorial responsibilities.
iv. The Private Sector contribution to the prevention of corruption and fight against associated money laundering is undermined by a lack of understanding of AML/CFT obligations by reporting entities.
v. Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) are central to the anti-corruption efforts. In most countries, they receive, analyze, and disseminate financial intelligence to the Investigators, the Prosecutors and other competent authorities which often lead to the prosecution of money laundering cases linked to corruption.
vi. National legislations on whistleblower protection are in various stages of deployment and/or implementation. Some of the countries within the region make use of web-based solutions to secure the anonymity and protection of whistleblowers.
vii. The enforcement of assets declarations in all member States is still weak and fragmentary. And given this fact, the asset declaration documents are yet to constitute a veritable tool in the investigation of corruption and M/L matters especially in the investigation of public officials as well as PEPs.
viii. Several structural and systemic deficiencies including political instability, weaknesses of state institutions, financial exclusion, poor identification of infrastructures, high dependence on cash transactions etc. have created an opportunistic environment for impunity, corruption, and other economic and financial crimes.
ix. The members of the public and Civil Society Organizations are generally unaware of their role in reporting corrupt practices or lack confidence in the system’s ability to effectively protect whistleblowers.
x. PEPs exercise undue influence appointments and other activities in the ACAs in view of their powers to oversight their activities and this creates unnecessary pressure.
xi. Inter-agency collaboration is not organized or legislated, and, in some instances, data privacy laws impede the ability of law enforcement to obtain information needed for asset investigations.
xii. Confiscation is often made based on anti-corruption legislations and is generally limited to the proceeds and instruments of corruption. Parallel financial investigations are often conducted by few countries but remain challenged by a lack of specialized knowledge and expertise on AML/CFT.
xiii. Member states lack the resources, capacity and initiative to set up a centralized criminal database which is a critical resource in the investigation and prosecution of corruption and M/L cases. The overlapping issues on institutions’ mandates as well as the rivalry among AML/CFT Agencies or lack of cooperation among them provoke a lethargy that may have serious implications for the entire criminal justice chain.
5) In view of these important issues raised, We, the Participants of the Workshop, formulate, among others, the following Recommendations to Member States, GIABA and Technical and Financial Partners:
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
i. Promoting transparency and integrity in both public and private sectors ensuring that all material information in respect of procurement of public contracts as well as the identity of beneficial owners are disclosed and published on relevant web sites.
ii. Putting in place an independent accountability mechanism for law enforcement agencies to ensure that they do what is right and can be seen to be doing what is right. Such a mechanism should have powers to conduct periodic inspections, receive and review periodic reports and complaints from citizens. Such a body and its membership should have a parliamentary guarantee to insulate it from political or any type of interference.
iii. Strengthening the collaborative framework between anti-corruption agencies and AML/CFT actors to ensure that AML/CFT laws and regulatory mechanisms are effectively used to curb corruption.
iv. A number of anti-corruption agencies currently without investigative and prosecutorial powers, should be so empowered so as to strengthen their operations or any alternative measures that would give them the rights and full capacities to follow up on disseminations to judicial authorities.
v. Adopting non-conviction-based assets forfeiture in compliance with the FATF standards.
vi. Taking appropriate measures to identify, assess and understand the corruption opportunities that exist in all public institutions and design tailor-made prevention and control measures.
vii. Digitalizing public sector processes and procedures with a view to ensuring efficiency in the service and taking other measures to limit human interaction in those processes and procedures especially with respect to making payments, bidding, or participating in tenders, etc. This should be considered as part of a high-level response to corruption in every nation.
ix. Establishing parliamentary investigation committees on corruption and publishing their recommendations.
x. Ensuring that all public officials should be systematically subjected to assets declaration, verification, and continuous monitoring.
xi. Ensuring that whistleblowers are accorded the highest protection and any threat to their safety and security should attract higher sanctions than the original case, in which they provided information.
xii. Considering setting up an inter-agency task force or committee, to administer the auctioning of recovered assets in an accountable and transparent manner. Members of the body should be people with highest integrity and with no conflict of interest.
xiii. Developing national anti-corruption strategies that consider corruption opportunities and risks in all strata of their public services, covering issues of integrity, prevention of the misuse of power for personal gain and provision of adequate protection against the misuse of public resources concerning mobilization, collection, management, and utilization.
xiv. ECOWAS Commission should strengthen and integrate the Network of Anti-Corruption as a Statutory Committee and provide the Network with required resources to carry out its work of strengthening regional capacity, cooperation, and collaboration against corruption.
xv. Anti-Corruption Agencies should adopt and systemize parallel money laundering investigation for all cases of corruption and ensure that criminal proceeds are traced, recovered, and confiscated.
xvi. Cases of corruption linked to self-laundering by deceased suspect should not be terminated but pursued to logical conclusion using all available information and evidence unless where the case can be proven otherwise.
xvii. Establishing or strengthening independent accountability mechanisms for law enforcement agencies under the purview of the Minster of Justice and/or the Judiciary.
xviii. Heads of Anti-Corruption and Other Principal Officers should be accorded the sanctity of tenure unless in the case of violations and with full regard to due process. Anti-Corruption Agencies should be accorded powers to temporarily freeze accounts and/or transactions with court warrants, and in situations where the funds or assets of concern will be dissipated, without warrant while providing a cause to a court of law afterwards for doing so.
xix. Taking appropriate measures to strengthen the independence and managerial autonomy of national anti-corruption agencies, as well as the integrity of their staff. These measures should be accompanied by incentives and alternative methods of financing.
xx. Taking appropriate measures to ensure that skills are valued, and merit is prioritized in public administration. These measures should consider the advisability of calling for applications when recruiting senior civil servants.
xxi. Ensuring greater involvement of the media/civil societies in the procurement process especially to monitor and report on project implementation and illegal/corrupt practices.
xxii. Making a provision for formal validation of some relevant public projects by the end users of such projects, to ensure that end users of public projects have an input in confirming that every public project is fit for purpose and there has been value for money in respect of the said project. End users will be representatives of organized CSOs, media, relevant professionals in the Local governments and s states in respect of federal projects meant for states and Local governments.
xxiii. Enhanced use of ICT in the public sector especially in the areas of accounting and payroll management which will provide an important mechanism for the tracking of public sector public expenditure thus providing a useful tool for investigative purposes.
xxiv. Ensuring that Anti-Corruption Agencies create a Disclosure Register of filial and family relationships amongst staff, Management, Board and PEPs for the purpose of disclosing any relationships that may be material in the course of the work of the Agencies.
xxv. Implementing the recommendations made in the GIABA Typologies’ Report of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing linked to Corruption in West Africa in line with each country’s risks and context.
THE PARTICPANTS
DONE AT ABUJA, ON 25/08/2023
