22nd September 2026
His Excellency John Dramani Mahama
President of the Republic of Ghana
Jubilee House
Accra
PETITION AGAINST THE SITING OF SENTUO AIRPORT GARDEN CITY PROJECT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO GHANA’S STRATEGIC MILITARY AND DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS
Your Excellency,
I, Samson Asaki Awingobit, respectfully write to you in my capacity as a private citizen of the Republic of Ghana, more importantly, as a concerned Ghanaian, to respectfully draw Your Excellency’s attention to a matter of significant national-security importance concerning the recently launched US$1.3 billion Sentuo Airport Garden City Project at the Airport enclave in Accra.
On 15 September 2026, Your Excellency performed the ceremonial sod-cutting for the project, which is being developed by Sentuo Group. Publicly announced plans indicate that the development will comprise approximately 582 premium apartments, a 600-room hotel, a 2,500-capacity conference facility, healthcare facilities, a shopping mall, landscaped gardens, parking facilities and other commercial and leisure amenities. The project is located at 10 Giffard Road, Airport Residential Area, Accra.
I acknowledge and appreciate the importance of foreign direct investment, private-sector development, job creation and the expansion of Ghana’s hospitality, residential and commercial infrastructure. I am therefore not opposed to the Sentuo Group’s investment in Ghana, nor am I opposed to legitimate Chinese investment in our country.
My concern is specifically about the strategic location of this particular development and the possible national-security implications of placing a very large, high-rise, mixed-use private development in close proximity to sensitive national-security, defence and aviation infrastructure.
- THE STRATEGIC LOCATION REQUIRES A SECOND LOOK
The location of the proposed development demands careful examination beyond the ordinary planning and commercial considerations applicable to a conventional real-estate project.
Giffard Road is directly associated with the military-security landscape of Accra. Documentation on the Accra East Corridor identifies Giffard Road as running from the 37 Military Hospital across the El-Wak area, Burma Camp and towards the eastern part of Accra. The same documentation identifies the Burma Camp and Air Force Base areas along this corridor as military zones.
This geographical reality should compel the Government to undertake a comprehensive security assessment of the proposed development, particularly because of the scale and height of the structures contemplated.
The development is not merely a small commercial building. It is planned as a major urban complex comprising hundreds of residential units, a large hotel, conference facilities, healthcare services, retail facilities and other commercial uses.
Such a development, by virtue of its size, occupancy, technological infrastructure, security systems and vantage points, could potentially create security considerations that are fundamentally different from those associated with an ordinary residential or commercial property.
2. PROXIMITY TO DEFENCE AND NATIONAL-SECURITY INSTALLATIONS
Your Excellency, Ghana’s defence and national-security installations are strategic national assets.
The Government must therefore carefully consider whether the proposed development, once completed, could provide direct or indirect visual, technological or physical access advantages over sensitive government and military facilities.
High-rise buildings can provide elevated vantage points over surrounding areas. Modern residential and commercial developments can also contain extensive telecommunications infrastructure, surveillance cameras, access-control systems, data networks, security-control rooms and other technological systems.
The question Ghana must answer before the project progresses too far is therefore straightforward:
Have the Ghana Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence, the National Security architecture, the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Civil Aviation Authority and other relevant security agencies conducted a comprehensive security assessment of the proposed development and formally certified that its location, design, height, technological infrastructure, access arrangements and operational model pose no unacceptable risk to Ghana’s national security?
If such an assessment has been conducted, the Ghanaian public deserves confidence that the appropriate security authorities have considered these matters.
If it has not been conducted, it should be undertaken before construction proceeds beyond the point at which meaningful changes to the project would become difficult or prohibitively expensive.
3. WHO WILL CONTROL THE SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE COMPLEX?
Another issue that requires clarification concerns the security architecture of the completed development.
The project is expected to accommodate hundreds of residents, a major hotel, conference facilities and commercial establishments. Such a complex will inevitably require sophisticated surveillance, access control, communications infrastructure and security-control rooms.
The Government must establish, as part of the security assessment:
- Who will control the central security and surveillance systems?
- Who will have access to security-control rooms?
- Who will operate the CCTV monitoring infrastructure?
- Where will surveillance data be stored?
- Who will have administrative access to the systems?
- What categories of foreign nationals will have access to restricted areas?
- What cybersecurity protocols will govern the development?
- Will Ghanaian security agencies have statutory or operational oversight?
- What mechanisms will prevent unauthorized surveillance of nearby government, military or aviation installations?
- Will security personnel employed by the private development be subject to vetting by Ghanaian security agencies?
These are not questions directed at any particular nationality. They are questions that should arise whenever a major private development is situated close to strategic national assets.
4. LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Ghana should also learn from international experience without suggesting that legitimate investors or entire nationalities should be treated as security threats.
There are documented cases in which properties and commercial premises in foreign jurisdictions have subsequently been associated with organized cybercrime, fraud or money laundering.
In Dubai, an investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) found that three Chinese nationals connected to a Singapore money-laundering case had acquired at least 22 Dubai properties worth approximately US$28 million. OCCRP’s wider Dubai Unlocked investigation also identified numerous properties in Dubai connected to individuals accused or suspected of financial crimes.
OCCRP separately reported that Chinese national Daren Li, who was sentenced in absentia in the United States for his role in a cryptocurrency investment conspiracy involving the alleged laundering of more than US$73 million, owned a residential villa in Dubai.
These cases do not establish that Chinese-owned property is inherently a security threat. They demonstrate something much more important: legitimate-looking real-estate assets can, in particular circumstances, become associated with sophisticated criminal networks, and therefore ownership, beneficial ownership, tenant screening, financial due diligence and security oversight matter.
5. CAMBODIA PROVIDES ANOTHER IMPORTANT LESSON
Cambodia offers an even more direct example of why governments must not assume that large commercial or residential developments will necessarily be used only for their advertised purposes.
In May 2026, Cambodian authorities raided two buildings at Phnom Penh’s Prince Plaza Centre linked to the business empire of Chinese businessman Chen Zhi and detained 104 people, including 82 Chinese nationals, amid allegations of online-scam activity. Reports indicated that authorities seized hundreds of mobile phones and computers.
In another Cambodian operation in May 2026, authorities raided Ying Huang Casino in Preah Sihanouk Province. Four Chinese nationals were referred to court over allegations including operating a technology-based online scam center and money laundering, while 60 other Chinese nationals were transferred for deportation procedures. Authorities reportedly seized 925 computers from the premises. The casino’s operating licence was subsequently revoked.
Cambodian authorities have also reported numerous other operations involving buildings, residential compounds, hotels and casinos used or allegedly used for cyber-enabled fraud. In one April 2026 operation, authorities detained 218 foreign nationals at a condominium unit within the Phnom Penh Galaxy Garden complex over an alleged technology-based fraud operation; 93 of those detained were Chinese nationals.
These examples should not be interpreted as evidence against Chinese investment generally. Rather, they demonstrate the importance of robust due diligence, beneficial-ownership checks, tenant screening, cybersecurity controls, law-enforcement access and continuous security oversight when large private developments are established.
6. GHANA MUST NOT WAIT UNTIL A SECURITY INCIDENT OCCURS
Your Excellency, national security is fundamentally about anticipating threats rather than responding after the damage has occurred.
I am particularly concerned about the possibility that, in the future, individuals with hostile intentions towards Ghana could seek to acquire, rent or otherwise gain legitimate access to apartments or commercial facilities within such a development.
The strategic concern would become even greater if such persons were able to operate from elevated buildings with direct views towards sensitive government, defence or aviation infrastructure.
Furthermore, the project’s proximity to Kotoka International Airport presents another dimension that deserves examination.
If an individual using a property within the development were subsequently identified as posing a national-security threat, the proximity of the development to Ghana’s principal international airport could potentially become a factor in the individual’s ability to leave the country rapidly.
Again, I am not suggesting that this will happen. I am respectfully asking that Ghanaian security authorities assess whether such scenarios are reasonably foreseeable and what preventive safeguards should be put in place.
7. SECURITY SHOULD NOT BE AN AFTERTHOUGHT
The President’s own remarks at the sod-cutting ceremony emphasized the importance of coordinated development of the Airport enclave.
I respectfully submit that coordination must extend beyond roads, commerce, architecture and urban aesthetics.
It must include: National security, Defence, Aviation security, Cybersecurity, Counter-intelligence, Emergency response, Immigration controls, Financial intelligence, Foreign-investment due diligence.
A development of this magnitude should not proceed on the assumption that security issues can be addressed after the buildings have been completed.
8. OUR REQUESTS
In view of the foregoing, I respectfully petition Your Excellency to consider the following urgent measures:
1. Immediate suspension of further construction activity on the Sentuo Airport Garden City Project pending a comprehensive national-security assessment by the appropriate Ghanaian security and defence institutions.
2. Commission an independent multi-agency security assessment involving, at a minimum, the Ministry of Defence, Ghana Armed Forces, National Security, Ghana Police Service, Ghana Civil Aviation Authority, Ghana Airports Company Limited and any other relevant state institution.
3. Undertake a comprehensive strategic land-use review to determine whether the proposed height, density, orientation and location of the development are compatible with the security requirements of neighbouring defence, government and aviation installations.
4. Conduct a counter-surveillance assessment to establish whether the proposed structures could provide visual, electronic or technological access to sensitive national installations.
5. Establish clear security-control arrangements for the completed development, including the vetting of security personnel, access to surveillance systems, ownership and control of CCTV infrastructure, data storage, cybersecurity and cooperation with Ghanaian security agencies.
6. Conduct enhanced beneficial-ownership and source-of-funds due diligence on the project and all relevant corporate entities associated with the development, in accordance with Ghanaian law.
7. Review the proposed residential and commercial tenancy arrangements, particularly the mechanisms that will be used to identify and vet occupants, corporate tenants and other users of strategically sensitive facilities.
8. Determine whether modifications to the project’s design, height, orientation or restricted zones are necessary to protect neighbouring national-security assets.
9. Ensure that Ghanaian security agencies retain appropriate oversight of security arrangements within the complex once completed.
10. Make the findings of the security review available to the appropriate Parliamentary oversight institutions, subject to the legitimate confidentiality requirements of national-security information.
Your Excellency, I wish to make this point unequivocally.
9. THIS IS NOT A PETITION AGAINST CHINESE INVESTMENT
This petition is not anti-China. It is not anti-investment. It is not an objection to foreign direct investment. It is not an attempt to undermine the legitimate business interests of Sentuo Group.
Ghana welcomes responsible foreign investment and needs investment to create jobs, expand productive capacity and accelerate economic development.
However, economic development must never be pursued at the expense of national security. Our concern is therefore about location, strategic proximity, security architecture and long-term national interest, not the nationality of investors.
Indeed, the Government’s own emphasis on local participation in the project provides an opportunity to extend that principle to security and strategic oversight as well.
10. CONCLUSION
Your Excellency, the decision before us is not simply whether Ghana should welcome a US$1.3 billion investment. The investment is welcome. However, the question is whether this particular development, in this particular location, with this particular scale and configuration, has undergone sufficient national-security scrutiny before becoming irreversible.
Once hundreds of apartments, a major hotel, commercial facilities and other structures have been completed, it may be extremely difficult and costly for the Government to correct a security problem arising from the original location or design.
It is therefore better to ask the difficult questions now than to regret failing to ask them later.
I respectfully urge Your Excellency to take a second look at the location and strategic implications of the Sentuo Airport Garden City Project and direct an immediate, comprehensive national-security assessment before further construction proceeds.
I, Samson Asaki Awingobit, is not asking the Government to reject investment. I am however, appealing to the Government to ensure that no investment, however substantial, compromises the security of the Republic of Ghana.
The protection of Ghana’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, strategic installations and national interests must remain paramount.
I trust Your Excellency will give this petition the urgent consideration it deserves.
Yours faithfully,
…………..…………
HON. SAMSON ASAKI AWINGOBIT
Private Citizen, Republic of Ghana
Ashaiman, Accra
Email: samsonasaki1000@gmail.com
Cc:
- The Right Hon Speaker of Parliament
- The Chief of Staff, Office of the President
- The Minister for Defence
- The Minister for the Interior
- The National Security Coordinator
- The Chief of the Defence Staff
- The Inspector-General of Police
- The Director-General, Ghana Civil Aviation Authority
- The Managing Director, Ghana Airports Company Limited
- The Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Interior
- The Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Lands, Natural Resources and Forestry
- The Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on National Security
